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Abstract 
New Zealand is the first country to implement a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) that includes a forestry component as part of its contribution to global climate mitigation 
and as a strategy for compliance with the international climate change agreement the Kyoto 
Protocol. The goal of this paper is to provide information on forestry’s role in the New Zealand 
ETS such that a foreign policymaker will be able to understand the intricacies and issues of the 
New Zealand system and be able to apply this knowledge to the design of his or her own ETS. 
This paper also aims to provide useful documentation of the system as it stands in 2010 for the 
New Zealand Parliament to use in future reviews of the system. The paper first provides a brief 
outline of the role of forestry in New Zealand’s ETS, including the reasons for its inclusion in 
the greater system and the rules by which forestry operates within the system. This paper then 
analyses these rules, indicating the reasons behind the inclusion of certain provisions where the 
reasoning may not be immediately clear. Finally, this paper provides both quantitative and 
qualitative data on how well the system is working so far, whether the system is operating as 
predicted, and why any discrepancies between predicted and actual outcomes arise. 
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New Zealand is the first country to implement a greenhouse gas Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) that includes a forestry component as part of its contribution to global climate 
mitigation and as a strategy for compliance with the international climate change agreement the 
Kyoto Protocol.
1
The goal of this paper is to provide information on forestry’s role in the New Zealand 
ETS and a preliminary evaluation of the operation and effectiveness of the system in 2010. This 
could be useful to both foreign policymakers, who will be able to understand the intricacies and 
issues of the New Zealand system and apply this knowledge to the design of their own ETS, and 
to the New Zealand government for use in future reviews of the system. 
 
The paper draws on previous literature, official documents, registry and monitoring data, 
and a set of interviews with a wide range of people involved in the design and implementation of 
the system: government officials, foresters, carbon market operators, environmental NGOs, and 
researchers. The paper finds that the forestry ETS is working relatively smoothly from an 
administrative point of view and a reasonable number of participants have already registered. 
The inclusion of forestry in New Zealand’s ETS has reduced deforestation and changed thinking 
about management and new planting, but with only limited observable change to behaviour so 
far. The markets in which units are sold are evolving slowly and linking in predictable ways to 
international markets.  
The key barrier to new planting is uncertainty about international and domestic policies, 
which drive the value of future carbon credits on which the profitability of new planting 
depends. Until this uncertainty abates, new planting levels are likely to be low. If long-term 
carbon prices become firmer, through either an extended or a new international agreement or a 
linkage to a larger market such as the European Union ETS, foresters are poised to respond on a 
large scale.  
Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, industrialised countries (known as Annex I countries) 
committed to take responsibility for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions relative to a 1990 
baseline in order to reduce the level of climate change. Within the Protocol, reductions are 
encouraged by assigning each country a target level of emissions and a matching assigned 
                                                 
1 During the process of photosynthesis, forests remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and fix it in plant biomass (e.g. the wood and 
leaves). Thus, forests are carbon “sinks”, meaning that they store carbon in a place where it has no significant impact on the climate. However, 
when a forest is cleared, the carbon is released from the biomass over time and returned to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, making the forest a 
source of carbon emissions rather than a sink. Therefore, forests are hugely significant to the global climate system in that their presence and 
planting can decrease the total greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, while deforestation and harvesting can increase it. 2 
 
amount of units representing emissions. They may then choose to sell units to countries that are 
emitting over their assigned amount, or purchase from countries emitting under their assigned 
amount in order to match actual emissions to units surrendered. As a result of this trading of 
units, emissions will be reduced in a more cost-effective manner.  
In order to comply with their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol, many countries 
have established or are in the process of establishing domestic emissions trading schemes. New 
Zealand is the first country outside of Europe to implement such a system.  
The reason that New Zealand has included the forestry sector in the ETS is that some of 
the most cost-effective net emissions reductions in New Zealand may come from reduction of 
deforestation and/or increased reforestation and afforestation.
2 By incorporating forestry into 
the ETS, deforestation activity will occur only where it is cost effective to do so, since those who 
deforest will have to have the proper amount of permits to surrender or else pay the penalties. 
Moreover, the system rewards those who participate in reforestation and/or afforestation 
activities “by passing the carbon units earned under the Kyoto Protocol to forest owners” in the 
form of New Zealand Units (NZUs).
 3,4
In the New Zealand ETS, the responsibilities a forestry participant faces are based on the 
year of forest establishment and split along the 1990 Kyoto baseline into two categories: pre-
1990 and post-1989 forest. Entry of post-1989 forest into the system is voluntary. Post-1989 
participants can earn credits from 2008 (the beginning of the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol) for the net increases in the carbon stocks of their trees, and they may choose to 
sell these credits on the carbon market. However, these participants are also liable for any net 
decreases in the carbon stocks of their forest from 2008 and must surrender credits to the 
government if there is a net decrease, but only to the extent of the net units issued. If their post-
1989 forest land is deforested, they must repay the net units issued to the deforested land. Figure 
1 shows a visual representation of this process for a single-age, single-species forest (assuming 
harvest followed by replanting for rotation one and harvest followed by land use change for 
rotation two). 
 
                                                 
2 Afforestation is the act of planting new forest species on land that has never been in forest (or has not been in forest for a very long time). 
Reforestation is the replanting of forest species on land that has recently been in forest but is no longer. 
3 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 8 
4 An NZU is New Zealand’s carbon credit, equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide. 3 
 




On the other hand, pre-1990 participants are unable to earn credits for increases in the 
carbon stocks of their forest and are not liable for emissions at harvest as long as they do not 
deforest the land. However, they are liable for any deforestation activity that they undertake. If a 
pre-1990 forest is deforested, that forest is mandatorily entered into the ETS and participants are 
liable to surrender credits equivalent to the full decrease in carbon stocks of their forest. There is 
a one-off free allocation of credits to pre-1990 participants as compensation for losses in land 
value.  
If a forest owner replants their forest after harvest, it is not considered deforestation. 
However, measures are put in place to prevent foresters from cheating the system by deforesting 
young, regenerating trees. Thus, when a forest owner harvests and replants their trees, they must 
let the new trees grow for at least nine years before deforesting. If the forest owner does not 
wait, they are fully liable for the mature trees that were recently harvested in that area.
6
Analyses of forestry’s impact on climate change and potential policy solutions to take 
advantage of forestry mitigation opportunities have been performed for more than a decade, 
 
                                                 
5 Data taken from the look-up tables provided by MAF in the Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, Schedule 4.  
Note: In the first graph of Figure 1, there is an arrow added onto the end of year 56. This arrow is to show what would happen to the stock in 
year 56 if the land were not replanted after harvest (stocks would go to nearly zero). Since Figure 1 is a graph showing 2 rotations with the 
assumption that replanting will occur ad infinitum, the arrow needed to be added in order to correct for the deforestation assumption after period 
2. 
6 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 26 
















with early New Zealand papers such as Maclaren and Wakelin (1991) first identifying the 
opportunities in New Zealand. More recently, Maclaren and Manley (2010) discuss forestry’s 
potential to offset New Zealand carbon emissions and Kerr et al. (2004) discuss design issues for 
a forestry component of an ETS. 
After an ETS was proposed in government as a possible policy solution to New 
Zealand’s Kyoto responsibility, one of the first papers discussing the forestry sector’s 
involvement in the New Zealand ETS was Kerr and Sweet (2008), which addressed some of the 
critical logistical issues surrounding forestry, including the risk that allowing foresters some 
choice over their monitoring regime would lead them to choose the option that provides them 
the greatest gain and hence to bias in the amount of carbon rewarded, and the costs associated 
with having many small forest owners as points of obligation. That paper also touched on the 
issues surrounding free allocation of units to owners of pre-1990 forests, discussing the necessity 
of compensation for “stranded assets” as a way to address political and equity concerns and, by 
raising forest sector support for the system, to improve responsiveness. 
Evison (2008) discusses the scheme’s effect on the profitability of radiata pine and 
Maclaren et al. (2008) explore the effect on a wider range of species. Both of these studies 
suggest that carbon forestry has significant potential for profitability with the scheme in place; 
however, both studies also mention the riskiness of the investment. Evison raises concerns about 
“the lack of an active market” and Maclaren et al. identify worries about “the absence of a clear 
policy environment” and “cash-flow difficulties at the time of harvest”.
7
Jiang et al. (2009) look at both the New Zealand system and the state of the international 
carbon market, and their conclusions again address the issue of uncertainty in the system. The 
paper claims that “the success of NZ’s ETS will hinge ... on the emergence of an open, viable, 
and liquid, international carbon market”, adds that this “is unlikely to occur unless parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol make progress on committing to action beyond Commitment Period 1,” and 
describes the ETS’s vulnerability to and reliance on what occurs on the international landscape.
 
 These are some of the 
most relevant issues facing the system today, particularly with regard to the uncertainties that the 
foresters face. Turner et al. (2008) built on this literature, creating models for forest management 
under the ETS that incorporated some of these uncertainties and risks, particularly those related 
to carbon price fluctuations.  
8
Essentially, the academic landscape with regard to the forestry ETS, prior to the 2009 
revision of the scheme by the new National Government, was relatively optimistic despite 
 
                                                 
7 Evison, 2008, p. 44; Maclaren et al., 2008, pp. 3, 30 
8  Jiang et al., 2009, p. 19.  Moyes (2008) is another article that discusses the New Zealand ETS as a whole. 5 
 
presenting caveats about the uncertainty in the system. After the 2009 revision to the New 
Zealand ETS law, however, the academic landscape became slightly less optimistic; Mason 
(2010) suggests that less new planting, less demand for forestry NZUs, and a slower process of 
emissions reduction would result from the revised policy. Bertram and Terry (2010) address 
many of the issues and potential flaws in the system, ranging from worries about future liabilities 
incurred as a result of present sale of credits to worries about the “uncertainty over [the NZU’s] 
long run value”. Their suggestion that “the ETS was a product of necessity ... [that will] soon 
prove unfit for purpose” implies that in some people’s perception the ETS still has many issues 
that need to be ironed out. By contrast, Maclaren and Manley (2010), on the impact of carbon 
trading on forest management practices, reaffirm that carbon still has potential for profitability 
although there is significant price risk under the current version of the law. 
Because this is the first time forestry has been included in an ETS and because of the 
significant international and domestic uncertainties surrounding such a policy, the mere passage 
of time in these early stages can lead to major shifts in response to the system. Moreover, as time 
passes, the policy and the environment in which it operates evolve. Amendments to the system 
in 2009, a weak international agreement in Copenhagen, and the entrance of the industrial and 
transportation sectors into the system in July 2010 all affect its operation.  
This paper uses qualitative and quantitative data to determine what issues are currently of 
most relevance to those involved with the scheme and how strongly those issues are affecting 
behaviour. We capture a snapshot of the performance of the scheme as it stands at a time when 
the market and demand-driven incentives have begun to develop.  
The paper first gives background information on forestry and emissions in New Zealand. 
It then provides a detailed discussion of the forestry ETS rules – responsibilities, mapping and 
monitoring, and NZU allocation – including explanation of the reasons behind some key 
choices. This is followed by discussion of predictions of the system’s potential, data and 
interview evidence on the actual performance so far, and outstanding issues that might need 
further policy or institutional development. We conclude with suggestions for potential 
complementary policies.  
2. The New Zealand Forestry Sector 
In New Zealand, forest species fall under one of two categories: indigenous and exotic. 
Indigenous forest is protected under the Forests Act 1949, which was amended in 1993 in order 
to halt unsustainable forest management. It promotes sustainable management such that a forest 6 
 
will “provide the full range of products and amenities in perpetuity while retaining the forest’s 
natural values”.
9 Only indigenous forests with sustainable management plans can be logged, 
meaning that “only single trees and small groups of trees can be felled for timber production” at 
a given time, rendering these forests mostly invulnerable to felling of trees for logging.
10
Indigenous forest land is also protected from logging by a voluntary agreement, the New 
Zealand Forest Accord of 1991, in which major plantation foresters and a group of NGOs 
agreed that no plantation forestry will occur where there may be damage to indigenous forest 
species, and any harvesting of such species will be done sustainably. Additional protections for 
indigenous forest were agreed to in the 2007 New Zealand Climate Change Accord, which was 
an extension of the 1991 agreement and had provisions such as “avoid[ing] perverse outcomes 
such as the loss of indigenous forest”.
  
11 As a result of these measures, only about 2% of 
indigenous forest is available for timber production in New Zealand.
12
Exotic forest land (that is to say, forest comprised of non-native species) is not protected 
and is the form of forest land most commonly cleared and most often commercially harvested. 
Of the exotic species, radiata pine is the dominant species and makes up approximately 90% of 
the forest cover.
  
13 Douglas fir makes up 6% of the forest cover, and the remaining 4% is 
composed of a set of miscellaneous species, none of which is particularly common. Generally, 
exotic forest species are grown commercially for approximately 25–32 years and then they are 
cut down. In total, forestry contributes approximately 1.1% of New Zealand’s GDP.
14
2.1.  The Integral Role of Forestry in New Zealand’s Greenhouse Gas 
Budget 
 
New Zealand relies heavily on forest carbon sequestration as a mode of compliance with 
the Kyoto Protocol. In 2009, a quarter of New Zealand’s gross emissions (17.3 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent CO2-e) were offset by forestry sequestration.
15 New Zealand’s existing 
post-1989 plantation forests are expected to sequester 89.3 million tonnes of CO2-e over the first 
commitment period; New Zealand’s assigned amount for this same period is 309.6 million 
tonnes.
16 This sequestration is nearly enough to offset New Zealand’s growth in emissions since 
1990.
17
                                                 
9  Forests Act 1949, s2.  
 These sequestration numbers do not take into account any behavioural changes since the 
implementation of the ETS in 2008. In comparison, the entire European Union (as of 2003) was 
10 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2011 
11  Environment and Conservation Organisation of Aotearoa New Zealand, 2007 
12 Raison et al., 2001, p. 187 
13 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010d, p. 2 
14 New Zealand Treasury, 2010 
15  New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2011b 
16 New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2011c 
17 Ministry for the Environment, 2009 7 
 





Figure 2 also shows, this happy state of affairs is unlikely to continue in business as 
usual. Because of the uneven age-class structure of New Zealand forests, a large amount of 
harvesting around 2020 will make New Zealand forests a net source before growth in replanted 
forests makes them a sink again.  
Figure 2: New Zealand’s total and net greenhouse gas emissions and removals 




With current low forestry profitability, new planting is close to zero. Only carbon 
payments could induce the high levels of new planting that would change this projection of high 
forestry emissions to one where forestry continues to positively contribute to New Zealand 
compliance. If there were no uncertainty, under the current ETS and with a carbon price of $20, 
some estimates suggest that new forestry could by 2015 additionally offset all agricultural 
emissions, or nearly 50% of gross emissions.
20
2.2.  Indigenous Peoples and the Forestry Sector 
  
Starting in the 1980s, the New Zealand government began to settle outstanding Treaty of 
Waitangi claims with Māori, New Zealand’s indigenous population.
21
                                                 
18 European Commission, 2003, p. 28 
 The land returned to Māori 
was largely publicly owned and often forested. In some cases, “people who [were] cash poor 
19 Data sourced from New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2009. Additional data were also provided by the Ministry for the 
Environment. 
20 Kerr, 2010 
21 The Treaty of Waitangi (1840), considered New Zealand’s founding document, established a partnership between the Crown and Māori iwi. It 
made provision for British settlement and governance while protecting Māori property rights. Critical differences between the Māori- and 
English-language versions of the original document and breaches of the Treaty by British settlers led to the foundation in the 1970s of the 
Waitangi Tribunal. Its role is to investigate claims brought by Māori of breaches of the Treaty, and to make recommendations for recompense. 
The government began settling these claims in the 1980s; the process is ongoing (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a and 2011b).  8 
 
[became] asset rich”, and since some of the land granted would be more profitable if it were used 
for agriculture rather than forestry, there is a strong incentive for some Māori to deforest some 
areas.
22
2.3.  Other Values of New Zealand Forest 
  
New Zealand forests, especially indigenous species, have many other values to New 
Zealand citizens that go beyond industrial use and use as a carbon sink. Firstly, the tourism 
industry is an important sector in the New Zealand economy. Tourism directly and indirectly 
contributes approximately NZ$15 billion (9.1%) to the country’s GDP, and is responsible for 
184,800 jobs (9.6% of the workforce).
23
New Zealand’s forests are also integral to the protection of the environment, the 
prevention of soil erosion, and preservation of water quality. Water quality protection is 
particularly important to New Zealand. Forests protect water quality by blocking sediments and 
taking up nutrients that may enter bodies of water and cause problems, such as eutrophication, 
that diminish water quality. Recently many forests in New Zealand have been cut down to 
convert the land to dairy, which is very nutrient intensive. As a result, a number of water bodies 
are under threat of quality degradation due to the double hit of fewer trees and increased 
nutrients.
 Much of this tourism is fuelled by New Zealand’s “clean, 
green” image and “100% Pure” brand. As a result, the tourism revenue is strongly reliant on the 
survival of New Zealand’s unique indigenous forest species, as well as on New Zealand’s image 
as an eco-friendly country. 
24
The indigenous forests also have strong cultural significance, especially to Māori, who 




3. Forestry in the New Zealand ETS, the Rules That Surround It, 
and the Reasons for These Rules 
 Thus, indigenous forests have existence values for New 
Zealanders.  
This section details the main features of forestry in the New Zealand ETS, and explains 
the reasoning behind the inclusion of certain rules in the system. It begins with the context of 
the Kyoto rules and explains how the system categorises forest, the basic rules behind who gets 
                                                 
22  Gauntlett, 1998 
23  New Zealand Ministry of Tourism, 2010 
24 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2009a, pp. 95–107 
25 Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research, 2010, p. 7 9 
 
credits and who faces liabilities, the rules behind the mapping and monitoring of carbon stocks, 
the rules behind the physical allocation of credits, and how the New Zealand system links to the 
international system. More rules that may be useful to know, such as penalties for non-
compliance and how credits are treated under tax law, can be found in the Appendix. For further 
information on the structure of the program, consult the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (MAF)’s A Guide to Forestry in the Emissions Trading Scheme or the New Zealand 
Climate Change Response Act 2002 and the Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008. 
3.1.  Relevant Rules of the Kyoto Protocol 
New Zealand’s system is embedded in the Kyoto Protocol and is heavily influenced by 
its rules. After 2012, some of these commitments and rules may be changed. New Zealand has 
agreed to take responsibility for limiting its annual net greenhouse gases to 1990 levels during the 
first commitment period, 2008–2012, or purchase units from other countries to cover any 
excess. “[P]romotion of sustainable forest practices, afforestation, and reforestation” is one 
acceptable method of reducing domestic net emissions.
 26 Kyoto is essentially a global, 
intergovernmental emissions trading scheme with Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) as the basic 
international unit. Under the Kyoto Protocol, each country receives a certain number of AAUs 
and must either reduce emissions or trade so that they emit, on net, at or below the amount of 
greenhouse gases that they have AAUs to cover. Currently, New Zealand’s annual allocation of 
AAUs is equivalent to New Zealand’s gross emissions in 1990.
27
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable 
changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the 
commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenhouse 
gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with those activities shall 
be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with 
Articles 7 and 8.
 The complex forestry rules that 





                                                 
26 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, p. 3 
27 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b 
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, p. 3. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2003) elaborates on 
this. 10 
 
The other key component of the Kyoto rules is the “fast forest fix”:  
Carbon accumulated between 1990 and 2008 as a result of afforestation/reforestation 
activities is not credited within the 2008–2012 accounting period. However, at the 
time of harvest, if all carbon stock changes had to be accounted for, this would result 
in debits resulting from harvesting for land afforested/reforested since 1990 being 
greater than credits accounted for on that unit of land. For the first commitment 
period, this was addressed with the Afforestation/Reforestation Debit Rule (Fast 
forest fix). This rule ensures that activities that increase carbon stocks relative to 1990 
are not counted as debits under Article 3.3.
29




3.2.  How does the New Zealand ETS Categorise Forests, and What 
Responsibilities Do Participants of Different Types Face? 
 
As well as indigenous and exotic, New Zealand’s forests are split into two further 
categories, determined by the year that the forest was first established: pre-1990 and post-1989.  
3.2.1.  Baseline Years: Distribution of Costs and Benefits  
In an ETS, the choice of baseline year dividing forest that incurs only liability from forest 
that is eligible for credit is a decision that has massive implications for the distribution of costs 
and benefits. It is equivalent to the initial allocation of units in a cap and trade system.
31
It would have been possible to provide credits only for forests planted after 2008 while 
still holding foresters liable for deforestation of forests that existed in 1990. This would have 
 The 
earlier the baseline for forests to receive credit, the higher the benefits for foresters and the 
higher the costs for the government, since the government will have to provide credits to a larger 
area of forest and will get payments for deforestation liability on a smaller area, while the forestry 
sector has a larger area of forestry that is eligible to receive credits and less liability.  
                                                 
29 New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2008, unpaginated. Section 4.2.5.3.2 of the IPCC’s Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (2003), “Harvesting of Afforestation/Reforestation lands during the commitment period,” states that it is good practice to 
identify the afforestation and reforestation lands on which harvesting occurs during the first commitment period, and to track the amount of 
credits received previously for these lands.  This way the debits for harvesting on afforestation and reforestation lands can be limited to the 
amount of credits received previously for the same land. 
30 If the fast forest fix is not extended beyond 2012, some forests that are harvested will face net costs.  
31 A baseline could be set by assigning a counterfactual level of forest if a regulator was able to predict reforestation or deforestation at a property 
level with any accuracy. Using a specific year creates an implicit counterfactual that any forest that exists at that point will remain forever, while 
no new forest would be planted after that year. This is clearly unrealistic for a 1990 baseline – there has always been some deforestation of 
existing forest and there were high levels of new planting without a carbon reward. However even if a regulator knew the aggregate levels of 
deforestation and replanting with certainty , which is not feasible, applying these average levels of deforestation and new planting to specific 
pieces of land is extremely difficult. A 3% deforestation rate on land that is harvested each year would require that the regulator identify which 
3% of forest land will not be replanted. Similarly, if the regulator knew there would be 60,000 hectares of new planting, it could occur on any 
currently non-forested land across New Zealand. Regulators are unable to predict the location of change with any accuracy. 11 
 
minimised the government’s devolution of credits but would also have meant that the 
government would have retained liability for the harvest of forests planted between 1990 and 
2008. Owners of forests planted between 1990 and 2008 would also have had no incentives to 
change management of their forests, including deciding not to extend rotation or not to harvest. 
If most of these forests were harvested (which they would be with no carbon returns), the net 
value of the devolved credits and liabilities in the long term would not be that high. Thus, the 
government does not lose much by devolving credits and liabilities.  
Considerable political pressure was applied to encourage the government to offer to 
devolve all credits (and liabilities) for forests planted post-1990. For forest that will not be 
harvested (which could be a lot in a devolved system if carbon prices are high) this carbon has 
considerable value. For rotation forests planted in the 1990s, the value is much smaller, because 
of the offsetting liabilities. According to Peter Weir of Ernslaw One (a large forestry company), 
the New Zealand government chose to maintain the Kyoto Protocol 1990 baseline in the 
domestic ETS because it was the baseline associated with the least economic and political cost. 
By mimicking Kyoto, the government had a baseline that was easily justifiable to UN auditors as 
well as to domestic constituents.
32
More pressure was applied to not hold landowners liable for deforestation on land that 
was in forest in 1990, with much concern about the arbitrary nature of the date. Some specific 
tracts of land suffered significant losses and their owners were particularly vocal, but the 
government resisted pressure to accept liability. It was concerned about the potential for forestry 
companies to move forest so that it could claim credits on new forest without facing liability for 
the old forest. Owners of pre-1990 forest would also have liked a date earlier than 1990 for the 
credits and liabilities. However, under current Kyoto rules this would have imposed a further net 







35 choice leads to some inequities, many 
recognise that “policy is about drawing lines in the sand”
36 and that “any year would be 
arbitrary”.
37
                                                 
32 Interview with Peter Weir of Ernslaw One, 22 July 2010. In fact the UN auditors should have no interest in our domestic policy baseline – they 
are concerned only about our Kyoto compliance.  
 Thus, it seems that people do not find the 1990 choice to be a major problem with 
the policy. It is certainly notable that an issue with such large distributional implications has 
33 Interview with David Rhodes of Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
34 Interview with Phil Taylor of Blakely Pacific, 12 August 2010 
35 Interview with Alex Thompson of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 5 August 2010 
36 Interview with Phil Taylor of Blakely Pacific, 12 August 2010 
37 Interview with Alex Thompson of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 5 August 2010 12 
 
come to be so resolved in the public mind – a sign that the government’s strategy in selecting 
1990 to reduce costly argument over the baseline date was successful. 
3.2.2.  Indigenous, Pre-1990 Forest 
Indigenous forests that have been determined to be established prior to 1990 are not 
included in the ETS. MAF justifies this on the basis that carbon stocks in these forests have been 
determined to be in a “steady state overall”.
38 This seems unwise because the application of the 
ETS to exotic forestry but not to indigenous forests could put indigenous forests at risk of 
deforestation.
39 However, because of their age the forests are mostly protected by the Resource 
Management Act, the Forest Accord and the Forests Act 1949, and thus are relatively 
invulnerable to deforestation. Because they were planted before 1990, New Zealand cannot earn 
credits for increasing these indigenous forest carbon stocks under the Kyoto Protocol, so there is 
no benefit to including them.
40
3.2.3.  Exotic, Pre-1990 Forest 
  
Like the indigenous forests, pre-1990 exotic forests also cannot earn credits for increased 
stocks because of the Kyoto Protocol.
41
All types of forest covered by the ETS were entered together in 2008, as early as was 
politically possible given the timing of New Zealand’s Kyoto Protocol commitments, and before 
other sectors. The reason for this was that landowners have considerable control over the timing 
of deforestation. If a landowner is anticipating a large liability if they clear their land after the 
ETS commences, they have a strong incentive to clear land before this. Ideally, forestry would 
have been liable for deforestation from the date of the announcement, to avoid this perverse 
incentive.  
 However, unlike the indigenous forests, since there are 
no controls over exotic forests such as the Forests Act or the Forest Accord, the pre-1990 exotic 
forests do incur a liability to the landowner if more than two hectares is deforested in any given 
five-year commitment period. If the landowner goes over the two-hectare limit, they mandatorily 
enter into the ETS as a participant and must surrender NZUs equivalent to their emissions from 
deforestation.  
                                                 
38 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 8 
39 Conversion to plantation forestry is the main threat to scrub land. Between 1996 and 2002, nearly all scrub that was cleared was converted to 
exotic forest.  
40 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 8 
41 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 9 13 
 
A pre-1990 participant can apply for one of two exemptions to the ETS: the tree-weed 
exemption
42 or the 50-hectare exemption.
43
3.2.4.  Post-1989 Forest 
 If they are granted these exemptions they are free 
from liability for deforestation. 
For post-1989 forest, both exotic and indigenous forests fall under the same rules in the 
ETS. Indigenous forest is still protected by the Forests Act, but technically under the ETS there 
is no distinction between the policies regarding the two types of forest if they were grown post-
1989. 
Entering a post-1989 forest into the ETS is voluntary. A participant may choose to enter 
all, some, or none of their forest into the system. If a post-1989 forest enters the ETS, then it 
may receive NZUs for any net increase in carbon stocks from period to period and is also liable 
for any net decrease in carbon stocks below the last reported value of the total carbon in that 
participant’s forest land. If a post-1989 forest is not entered, it faces no liability for deforestation. 
A post-1989 forest may be entered into the system after 2012, but the landowner will 
receive credits only for carbon sequestered after 2013.
44 The Kyoto “fast forest fix” is built into 
the New Zealand system. It limits the liability of a forest participant to the amount of NZUs 
previously granted (net any that a participant has already surrendered to the government) for a 
given Carbon Accounting Area (discussed below). This would initially seem to be an odd policy 
in that a forest participant can enter some post-1989 forest into the system, grow it out over the 
course of a return period and obtain credits for it, and then harvest it without full liability. This 
means that the participants might harvest inefficiently early.
45
                                                 
42 One exemption to mandatory participation in the ETS for deforesting pre-1990 land is if the deforestation activity is for the purpose of the 
removal of “tree weeds”. Tree weeds are defined as trees that inhibit the growth of other species or the health of the ecosystem. A prominent 
example of these tree weeds are the “wilding pines” found in certain areas of New Zealand. These groups of pine species tend to prevent the 
regeneration of native forest floor species, compete with native trees and plants that have been known to provide valuable ecosystem services, 
and are seen as “visually intrusive” in the places where they invade (New Zealand Department of Conservation, 2010). They also spread very far 
and very rapidly; seeds of wilding pines can travel up to 30 km (interview with Alex Thompson of Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 5 August 2010). This makes their invasions difficult to control, as the seeds can grow on land far from the parent tree. As a result, 
it is difficult to know whose trees the seeds came from and who is liable to remove them. The New Zealand government included this exemption 
because certain areas of the country such as the Marlborough Sounds have taken great steps to control and reduce the spread of these wilding 
pine species, and without the exemption the ETS could greatly undermine these efforts by imposing a liability on those who cut them down 
(Climate Change Response Act, 2002). 
 
43 Another exemption for which a participant owning exotic, pre-1990 forest may apply is when the participant owns a total of less than 50 
hectares of pre-1990 forest land. If the forest land is controlled jointly between two or more people, none of the parties controlling the property 
“at that time is permitted ... to have owned more than 50 hectares of pre-1990 forest land. For calculation purposes, each ... [party’s] 
proportionate interest is treated as a divided interest”(New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 29). This exemption was 
included in the ETS by the New Zealand government because “the compliance costs for including very small pre-1990 forest holdings within the 
emissions scheme exceeds [sic] the benefits of doing so” (New Zealand Parliament, 2009). Note that this applies only to exotic forests; all pre-
1990 indigenous forests are automatically excluded from the ETS.   
44 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 8 
45 But from a climate point of view only. New Zealand as a whole does not bear this liability under international rules. The foresters gain full 
credit for increases in carbon stocks after harvest. 14 
 
In the context of a voluntary system, this waiver of liability increases efficiency by 
increasing generosity and thus increasing opt-in.
46
Criteria for a post-1989 forest 
 It reduces the penalty to forest participants 
who enter immediately with older existing forests. Otherwise they might decide instead to hold 
plots of forest land out of the system until after harvest and some potential gains through 
optimal management of carbon would be lost. It has little cost to government because the 
alternative would be that they gain the credits and bear the limited liability – foresters would be 
unlikely to opt in with full liability for existing forests. 
Forest can be classified as post-1989 under the following three conditions: 
•  The land was not in forest on 31 December 1989, and was afterwards 
established as forest land; 
•  The land was in forest on or before 31 December 1989, was deforested before 
1 January 2008, and then was later reforested;
47
•  The land was in forest on or before 31 December 1989, was exempt from 
ETS rules and deforested after 31 December 2007, then was later reforested – 




Table 1: Summary of rights and obligations 
 
  Pre-1990  Post-1989 
All forests  •  Not eligible for credits 
 
•  Voluntary participation 
•  Receives credits for 
sequestration  
•  Liable for net decrease in 
carbon stocks 
Indigenous  •  Protected under 
Resource Management 
Act, Forests Act and 
Forest Accord 
•  Poorly protected under 
Forests Act and Forest 
Accord 
                                                 
46 For formal analysis of this issue see van Bentham and Kerr, 2010 
47 This is done so that those who have deforested pre-1990 land prior to the entry of the forestry ETS into force in 2008 have an incentive to 
reforest this land (since if it were to be reforested and classified as pre-1990 land, they could not earn credits for it and would not spend the 
money to replant it). New Zealand will not receive Kyoto credits for this land. 
48 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 12 15 
 
•  No liability for 
deforestation  
Exotic  •  Mandatory participation if 
deforestation occurs 
•  Liable for deforestation 
•  Receives compensation 
credits  
 
3.3.  Points of Obligation 
The party that is the point of obligation for the ETS is liable for any deforestation or 
decreases in carbon stock. For post-1989 forest, the point of obligation is also the person who 
receives the credits for increases in carbon stocks. The underlying principle in identifying the 
point of obligation is that the party that controls the use of the land should be the point of 
obligation. It is their behaviour that the system aims to influence. Those with legal control are 
also easily identifiable for legal purposes. 
3.3.1.  Pre-1990 
For pre-1990 land, the person who is considered the point of obligation is the owner of 
that land, unless another party “has control over forestry land and the landowner cannot control 
that deforestation”.
49 This situation may occur, for example, in a scenario where there is a 
registered lessee on the land, and the lease allows the lessee to change land use.
50
3.3.2.  Post-1989 
   
For post-1989 land, the person considered the point of obligation is usually the 
landowner. However, it may also be a registered lessee, the holder of a registered forestry right,
51 
or a party to a Crown Conservation Contract.
52
                                                 
49 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 8 
 If there is a registered lease or a registered 
50 A “registered lessee”, in relation to the Land Transfer Act 1952 or the Deeds Registration Act 1908, is a person who has purchased a lease on 
the land. 
51 A “registered forestry right” is when somebody owns the right to the forest on a certain plot of land, but does not own the land itself. This 
right is governed by the Forestry Rights Registration Act 1983.  
52 A Crown Conservation Contract is an agreement with the government to aid the sequestration of carbon on post-1989 forest land managed by 
the government under the Conservation Act 1987.  16 
 
forestry right on the land, then permission from the landowner must be obtained before the 
lessee or the owner of the forestry right may be registered as a participant in the system, and vice 
versa. 
3.3.3.  Public Information about Liabilities 
Some market players have expressed concern that liabilities for ETS credits may, under 
some special circumstances, fall on landowners who are unaware of this risk.  
One possible source of this uncertainty occurs at the time land is purchased. The public 
can find out whether all or part of the land within a land title is subject to the Climate Change 
Response Act by searching land titles through New Zealand’s Land Information System, which 
is operated by Land Information New Zealand. A landowner of any post-1989 forest land in 
respect of which the holder of a forestry right or lease, or party to a Crown Conservation 
Contract, is a participant, or a prospective transferee, holder of a forestry right or lease, or party 
to a Crown Conservation Contract, who has the consent of the participant, can then apply for 
further information on the land through MAF. A caveat emptor regulatory position is taken with 
purchasers of land; they are expected to investigate these forestry liabilities themselves.
53
3.4.  Mapping Forest Land and Measuring Carbon Stocks 
  
3.4.1.  Mapping Forest Land and Defining Carbon Accounting Areas 
When a post-1989 forest enters the ETS or a pre-1990 participant deforests and submits 
an emissions return, the participant is required to provide a shapefile, which is a digital map that 
delineates a participant’s area of forest land.
54
For post-1989 participants, there is one more step before submission of the shapefile: the 
participant must choose how to define their Carbon Accounting Area (CAA). A CAA is the 
 In a shapefile, which is formed from a satellite or 
aerial image, the participant uses an online mapping tool provided by MAF to map virtual 
polygons around the shape of their forest. Polygons may contain only pre-1990 or post-1989 
forest. Where the boundary is unclear (for example, the two types of forests share a border area 
where both types may be found), the ambiguous area will be split down the middle by the edge 
of the polygon. The participant then submits the shapefile to MAF, who will use it to determine 
future changes in carbon stocks.  
                                                 
53 Some market players also expressed concern about another potential source of liability uncertainty. If a lessee became a participant in the ETS 
(with the permission of the landowner, as is required) and collected units for carbon sequestered as trees grow on the leased land, but then went 
bankrupt or was otherwise unavailable to bear liability, they were concerned that the liability would transfer to the landowner.  This is not the 
case, however: the debt is treated as an unsecured debt to the Crown, and the Crown takes the normal debt recovery actions. In 2011 MAF 
released a guide on land transactions in the ETS that is intended to clarify issues of liability when ETS land is transacted, which is available from 
www.maf.govt.nz/forestry/forestry-in-the-ets under Additional Resources. 
54 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2009 17 
 
basic unit of carbon accounting; the stocks in each CAA are measured at the end of each period, 
and total liabilities and credits are determined and recorded for each CAA. A CAA may be 
comprised of one or more polygons, and which polygons go in which CAAs can be arranged in 
any way that the participant wishes. 
This participant’s-choice model of CAA assignment was done in order to allow for added 
flexibility and for individual circumstances to be taken into account. Some people may want the 
simplicity of having just one CAA to manage. Others may want instead to group their CAAs by 
characteristics such as age.  
Another consideration landowners may want to take into account is liability. Since a 
participant’s maximum liability is capped at the number of NZUs previously allocated to a given 
CAA, the participant may want to organise their CAAs so as to “maximise the benefit of the 
liability cap”.
55
3.4.2.  Measuring Carbon Stocks 
  
Carbon stocks will be reported at the beginning and at the end of each emissions return 
period so that MAF can assess the change in stocks and the necessary liabilities and credits to be 
given out.
56
Currently, New Zealand uses look-up tables to determine the stocks of carbon in each 
forest. In the look-up table system, “well-established forest growth modelling techniques” are 
used to approximate the amount of carbon stored in forest biomass for a given forest species at 
a given age in a given location. These approximations are then provided in a series of tables that 
participants use to approximate the total stocks in their forest. For the New Zealand ETS, tables 
are available for radiata pine, Douglas fir, exotic hardwoods, exotic softwoods, and indigenous 
forest. Especially in the case of indigenous forest (where many species are generalised under one 
category), this system has a high margin of error which can result in significant under-reporting 
or over-reporting of stocks. However, until the field measurement approach has been finalised, 
this is the most accurate tool available and establishes a useful default amount of carbon stocked 
in a given tree of a given age in a given location.
 
57
There are two key reasons why the look-up tables are a particularly useful approach for 
measuring carbon stocks. First, they are incredibly cheap to maintain and to use. Second, they 
make it impossible to manipulate the system; there is a specific number of credits that a person 
   
                                                 
55 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2009, p. 18 
56 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 13 
57 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010c, pp. 6–8. Location is limited to region and only varies for Pinus radiata. 18 
 
may claim for a given species in a given place at a given age, and these numbers cannot be 
tinkered with by forest owners.
58
MAF is currently developing a field measurement approach to determine carbon stocks. 
This will involve more individualised on-site calculations that will boost accuracy of the 
measuring of carbon stocks.
  
59 It will provide incentives to change forest management and will 
better target high carbon sequestration locations for new forests.
60
As a result, the field measurement approach will be mandatory once per commitment 
period for participants with more than 100 hectares. Participants with less than this threshold 
must continue to use the look-up tables. Look-up tables will still be used to measure 
deforestation in pre-1990 forest. If voluntary use of the field measurement approach was allowed 
for small forests it would create an adverse selection problem; it is likely that only those who 
stood to gain from using the field measurement approach would do so. The look-up tables 
(excluding indigenous) are generally unbiased; if they were conservative, the adverse selection 
would be less likely to create overall bias and more people would be encouraged to use the more 
accurate field measurement approach.
 Although it will be more 
costly than the look-up table approach, the increased accuracy benefits are predicted to outweigh 
the extra cost in the case of larger plots of land.  
61 Implementation of this approach will commence in 
September 2011.
62
3.5.  How are NZUs Allocated? 
 
3.5.1.  Post-1989 Forest 
Once a post-1989 forest is registered in the system, the participant in control of that 
forest will be granted NZUs based on the net increase in carbon stocks in that forest during the 
time between the submission of each emissions return. Credits will be granted only for increases 
in stock from the beginning of 2008. 
Voluntary emissions returns may be filed between the first of January and the thirty-first 
of March each year.
63
                                                 
58 Some small foresters could alter the age slightly if records are poor but there is little Kyoto forest in the younger age classes that might benefit 
most from this. 
 A mandatory emissions return must be filed at the end of the first 
commitment period, and be submitted between the first of January and the thirty-first of March 
2013. Credits for net increases in stocks will be delivered to a participant’s account within two 
59 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 15 
60 Manley and Maclaren, 2010  
61 Information provided by Peter Gorman, MAF Sustainable Programmes.  
62 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 19 
63 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 19 19 
 
weeks of submitting the return, and credits for net decreases in stocks must be surrendered 
within 20 working days of filing the return.
64
3.5.2.  Pre-1990 forest 
 
In order to compensate pre-1990 forest landowners for the loss in value of their land as a 
result of the ETS, these landowners will be given a free allocation of NZUs (unless they have 
been granted an exemption from liability).
65 In order to receive this allocation they do not have 
to participate in the ETS, but they must provide “verifiable information” about their 
landholdings. They also must have an account with the New Zealand Emissions Unit Register 
(NZEUR), which is the central registry where NZU accounts are held and through which NZUs 
may be transferred between parties or surrendered to the government.
66
Allocation of NZUs for pre-1990 forest will be free and will occur in two tranches. In 
the first tranche, which will occur before the end of the first commitment period (31 December 
2012), 38% of a given participant’s allocation will be granted. In the second tranche, which will 
occur after 31 December 2012, the remaining 62% of the allocation will be granted. This two-
tranche system was chosen because the government believes that there is a possibility 
international rules may change to allow offsetting after 2012, thus causing the ETS’s impact on 
pre-1990 land values to decrease.
  
67
The amount of units that will be allocated to each pre-1990 participant will be 
determined by the pre-1990 Forest Land Allocation Plan. This plan was finalised at the 
beginning of July 2010 and came into force on 20 July 2010. There will be three levels of 
allocation: 
 This would allow the government to reduce the allocation in 
the second tranche and thereby cut costs. 
•  18 NZUs per hectare for any land that is or was Crown Forest Licence
68
•  39 NZUs per hectare for any land that was transferred on or after 1 November 
2002, or to a body corporate prior to this date where there have been changes in 
ownership (including beneficial ownership)
 land 
transferred to Māori under a treaty settlement on or after 1 January 2008, 
69
                                                 
64 There is no limitation on how many NZUs the government will give out for post-1989 forest; however, the government has the ability to 
regulate procedures for transactions involving approved overseas units (Climate Change Response Act 2002, s30G). 
 since acquiring this land, and 
65 Note that if landowners apply for a free allocation of allowances they must join the ETS, and if they apply for an exemption then they are 
barred from any free allocation. Both application processes are handled by MAF, which ensures that this condition is not broken. 
66  New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 10 
67 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 28 
68 A Crown Forest Licence is an arrangement where government-owned land is licensed out to a commercial foresting firm that will control all 
business operations. 20 
 
•  60 NZUs per hectare to any group to whom the above categories do not apply.
 70
The Pre-1990 Forest Land Allocation Plan was not unveiled with the rest of the forestry 
ETS because of a number of points of contention. The first concerned the distinction between 
39 and 60 NZUs per hectare and what constitutes a transfer of ownership. The distinction 
between 39 and 60 was put in place by the government because as of 1 November 2002, the 
government claims to have announced their intention to regulate deforestation. As a result, the 
government believes that people involved in transactions for forest land after that date could 
have reasonably incorporated this into the price of the land. However, this situation does not 
take into account land transfers that occur which do not involve a purchase or sale, such as the 
transfer of land to a family member as part of an inheritance. Under the initial plan, a transfer 
such as this, which does not involve sale or purchase (and therefore does not incorporate 
emissions controls into the value of the land), would still have caused the allocation to be 
reduced to 39 NZUs per hectare. These provisions are corrected for in the current plan and are 
no longer a point of contention. 
 
Another hotly contested issue was the 2002 date, at which the law assumes that people 
purchasing forest land would have been able to incorporate the future regulations into the price. 
However, according to forest owners, the likelihood of knowing about future regulation in that 
year was very small; the only evidence of future policy change available at that time was a press 
release by the then-minister Jim Anderton.
71 Furthermore, Treasury papers written in 2005 
indicate that there was still significant government uncertainty in how forestry regulations would 
be handled;
72 a carbon tax was still a likely option for a long time past 2002, and if that regulation 
had been passed instead of the ETS it would not have included forestry.
73
3.6.  How is the New Zealand ETS Linked to the International System? 
 This date was not 
changed in the Order that has come into force and remains contentious. 
NZUs are directly convertible on a 1-to-1 basis to New Zealand AAUs assigned under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Total registry holdings of AAUs are subject to the rules of the Commitment 
Period Reserve.
74
                                                                                                                                                        
69 “Beneficial ownership” is when a person has all of the benefits of ownership of an asset but is not technically the owner of the asset itself. For 
example, an older, retired forest owner may give another person the rights to handle that forest as if they were an owner although that person 
does not actually hold title to that forest. 
 The Commitment Period Reserve is a rule set in place by the Kyoto Protocol 
which states that during the commitment period of 2008–2012 no country may sell AAUs such 
that their holdings are below 90% of their 1990 emissions baseline, or such that their holdings 
70 Climate Change (Pre-1990 Forest Land Allocation Plan) Order 2010. 
71 Interview with Peter Weir of Forestry Company Ernslaw One, 22 July 2010 
72 Interview with David Rhodes of NZ Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
73 Interview with Geoff Keey of Greenpeace, 28 July 2010 
74 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010b, p. 7 21 
 
fall below five times their most recently reviewed inventory of units (whichever is lower).
75 This 
rule was put in place so that in this experimental and early stage of the agreement when there is 
no effective international penalty for non-compliance, no country sells so many units as to drive 
themselves into non-compliance either deliberately or by mistake.
76
Section 18CB of the Climate Change Response Act further restricts the exchange of 
AAUs with NZUs, stating that no “imported AAUs”, which are AAUs allocated through Kyoto 
to a party other than New Zealand and purchased by a New Zealand entity, can be surrendered 
to meet ETS obligations by a participant. This provision has been put in place for two reasons: 
first, the European Union’s ETS does not allow AAUs to be surrendered, so if in the future the 
New Zealand system were to link with the EU system, having this provision allows the two to be 
compatible.
  
77 Second, there is a perception that certain countries’ AAUs do not have 
environmental integrity due to “hot air”
78, so the government inserted this provision as a 
compromise with the concerned Green Party.
79 Further regulations related to this section of the 
law will in the future allow for the trading of some types of imported AAUs, but as of July 2010 
no action has been taken to ease this restriction.
80
Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects may be surrendered despite environmental integrity concerns, but tCERs and lCERs 
(temporary and long-term credits from CDM afforestation projects) may not be surrendered. 
Emission reduction units (ERUs) from joint implementation projects may be surrendered.
 
81,82
4. Some Initial Predictions of System Performance 
 
Essentially, overseas assigned-amount units and international forestry units are disallowed, but 
project-related Kyoto units are allowed. Thus the NZU price should be closely related to CER 
and ERU prices. 
4.1.  Predictions of Participation 
If a forester takes the most conservative position with respect to the sale of carbon 
credits, no post-1989 forest can lose by participating in the program (excluding the 
administrative costs, which are not inconsiderable for small foresters). Some may, however, 
                                                 
75 United Nations Foundation for Convention on Climate Change, 2001. Or see Baron (2001)  for a discussion of the decision, its workability and 
implications. 
76 Baron, 2001, p. 6   
77 Phone Conversation with the Ministry of the Environment, 19 July 2010 
78 “Hot air” is a phrase used to describe a scenario in which a country is given more emissions trading units than their emissions would be under 
business as usual, such that the trade of these units increases global emissions – though not relative to the levels negotiated in Kyoto. These 
concerns are most closely tied with former Eastern Bloc countries. 
79 Phone Conversation with the Ministry of the Environment, 19 July 2010 
80 Phone Conversation with the Ministry of Economic Development, 15 July 2010 
81 For discussion of “joint implementation” see Kerr and Leining (2004). 
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benefit more by delaying participation until after harvest because of the fast forest fix. Moreover, 
the carbon benefits from most existing post-1989 forests are only temporary because most were 
planted well before 2000 and the carbon stock in 2008 was already higher than the “safe” level to 
which it drops after harvest. Small foresters can only benefit from this temporary sequestration 
without risk if markets are sophisticated.
83
There is a very wide range of predictions of what the total participation in the forestry 
ETS will be in commitment period one. David Rhodes of the Forest Owners Association 
speculates that 80% of people who can register their forest land will register their forest land, 
since “you can’t play if you’re not in the game”.
  
84 However, Peter Weir of Forestry Company 
Ernslaw One speculates that only 25% of people who can register will register.
85 An A C Nielsen 
survey commissioned by MAF predicted that 37% of post-1989 forest land will be registered 
into the system before 2012.
86
4.2.  Predictions of New Planting and Changes in Management 
 The survey also found that an additional 20% of forest land may 
be registered after 2013, and 4% of land is unlikely ever to be registered. For 38% of the 
remaining post-1989 forest land, whether or not it will join is uncertain. A more difficult issue is 
how many new participants will enter forestry and how much new planting and management 
change the system will induce. 
The New Zealand government expects an increase in planting of post-1989 forest, better 
management of existing post-1989 forests so that sink efficiency is improved, and a significant 
decrease in deforestation of pre-1990 forest.
87
The reasons for these expectations can be made clear with an illustration: without an 
ETS, a new forest in the Central North Island would have an expected net present value (NPV) 
of approximately $3000 per hectare, where value comes solely from the sale of logs. In contrast, 
under the ETS with a constant NZ$25 per tonne CO2-e price, this same piece of new forest 
would have a NPV of approximately NZ$5900 per ha.
 
88
                                                 
83 Coleman, 2011 
 If instead the forester expected carbon 
prices to increase in real terms over time, this NPV would be even higher: if the price of carbon 
increased at 8% per year, the forester could earn an NPV of $8300. Thus, forestry becomes 
much more profitable with an ETS and foresters are expected to respond by planting new 
forests.  
84 Interview with David Rhodes of Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
85 Interview with Peter Weir of Ernslaw One, 22 July 2010 
86 A C Nielsen, 2010, p. 2 
87 Heyl, 2009 
88 This is calculated using MAF look-up tables, 2009 log prices, an 8% discount rate, a 28-year harvest age and forestry costs and yields given in 
Zhang et al., forthcoming. 23 
 
The size of this positive impact on planting can be explored using a few different 
sources. One is Motu’s Land Use in Rural New Zealand (LURNZ) model.
89 Assuming a certain 
and constant NZU price of $25 between 2008 and 2020, the latest LURNZ projections predict 
that on average an additional 42,000 hectares of forests would be planted annually over this 
period, relative to a case with no carbon price. This additional planting would sequester an 
additional 12 million tonnes of CO2 over this period.
 90
The New Zealand government’s projections of total new planting given in the Fifth 
National Communication under the UNFCCC provide another source of estimated planting. They 
project that under the rules of the current ETS, with a NZ$25 per tonne CO2-e price until 2013 
and a NZ$50 per tonne after that, 30,000 hectares per year of new planting will occur by 2020. If 
the carbon price rises to NZ$100 per tonne, they project new planting of up to 50,000 hectares 
per year by 2020.
 
91
 A third source for potential planting impacts is the latest forestry intentions survey, 
completed for MAF in 2010.
 The difference between the LURNZ model projections and these 
government projections gives some indication of the level of uncertainty inherent in providing 
future estimates of planting. 
92 Survey respondents indicated that between 2010 and 2012 they 
intend to plant new area equal to 23% of 2010 post-1989 forest area (130,000 hectares), 
increasing this total area to approximately 700,000 hectares. The LURNZ model predicts very 
similar levels of planting over this period (within 10% of these figures).
 93
4.2.1.   Potential for Farm Forestry 
  
There also seem to be strong potential gains in farm forestry. One broker suggests that 
an average sheep and beef farm can have up to 20% of its land area in non-productive use.
94
 First, the unproductive land on many farms is scattered in small parcels. As a result, 
farmers may have difficulty managing their forest (or being able to claim that their land 
 If 
the farmer planted forest in these non-productive areas, the farmer would have an extra source 
of income through forest credits. Although farm forestry appears to be a valuable opportunity 
for carbon sequestration, there are some significant barriers to taking advantage of it.  
                                                 
89 More information on Motu’s Land Use in Rural New Zealand (LURNZ) model is available at 
http://www.motu.org.nz/research/group/land_use_in_rural_new_zealand_model  
90 Zhang and McDonald, 2011 
91  New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2009 
92 A C Nielsen, 2010 
93 LURNZ predicts a change of 131,000 hectares over the 2008–2012 period (the shortest prediction period that LURNZ will run is four years). 
While the MAF intentions survey suggests planting of 130,000 hectares from 2008–2012, the provisional 2010 National Exotic Forestry 
Description (NEFD) report shows that new planting between 2008 and 2010 was only cumulatively 12,000 hectares (New Zealand Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2010a). Subtracting this number from the LURNZ estimates leaves a LURNZ prediction of 119,000 hectares of new 
planting for 2010–2012. It should be noted that this new planting is not only due to the ETS; improved forestry prices will also be contributing to 
planting decisions. 
94 Interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 4 August 2010 24 
 
constitutes forest land given the rules for minimum width of a forest area) if the trees are planted 
in many small blocks throughout the farm. For example, riparian boundaries are generally not 
eligible for credit. Fencing costs may also be high for small blocks. Thus, although 20% of a 
farm’s area may be unproductive, not all of this area may be suitable for carbon forestry. Also, 
land that appears unproductive may really be used in a very low intensity way, or for managing 
events such as drought. 
There are other reasons why farmers may be reluctant to convert land to forestry. They 
may have skills in livestock management but not in forestry, so may find forestry relatively less 
profitable or more risky. Some properties may be more valuable for alternative uses if they are 
primarily pasture. This could be particularly important if land is in a location where it could be 
subdivided or turned into a lifestyle property; many New Zealanders do not find Pinus radiata 
attractive. This is probably less important for indigenous reversion, but that is less profitable 
under the ETS. Finally, converting to forest is a long-term commitment and gives up future 
flexibility; and this loss of options has a cost.  
It has also been suggested that a bigger issue may be bringing about the change in 
mindset required for farmers to begin forestry activity on their land. They suggest that many 
farmers have been trained in a farming culture that sees brush on their property as a nuisance to 
be cleared, and bringing forest onto their land goes against what they have been taught. 
Moreover, many farmers are in their profession because they enjoy working with livestock; they 
get pleasure out of raising animals that they perhaps do not get out of growing forest; some 
farmers will not want to convert land for forestry for this reason. Thus, there are psychological 
barriers to overcome as well as logistical and financial ones. As a result, although there is 
certainly significant potential for carbon sequestration in farm forestry, it may be more difficult 
than expected to take advantage of that potential.  
5. The Performance of the System Thus Far 
5.1.  Carbon on the Market 
5.1.1.  Market Data 
We expect that the NZU price will be closely related to CER prices (in particular never 
higher, because CERs are a substitute for NZUs) and that CERs will be closely linked to 25 
 
European Union Allowances (EUAs), for which they are partial substitutes. NZUs cannot be 
used in the European ETS so may be less valuable than CERs.
95
Figure 3 shows that, on the international market, EUA prices have been fluctuating 





Figure 3: EUA prices from December 2004 to December 2009
 When forestry first entered the New Zealand system in 2008, international prices 
were much higher, reaching nearly €30 (approximately NZ$54.17). However, at around the time 
of the 2008 recession, the international market prices slumped steeply, reaching a low point in 
February 2009 at a price that was lower than €8 (approximately NZ$14.45). Through March and 





Figure 4 shows that CER prices in this period were following approximately the same 
fluctuations, but at a price approximately €1 to €2 lower than the EUA. These prices are closely 
linked because the EU market is a major source of demand for CERs. The price of the EUA is 
currently higher than that of the CER because the purchase of CERs is limited by the European 
Union ETS. As a result, there is a potential oversupply of CERs on the market, which decreases 
their price relative to the EUA.  
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96 Using an exchange rate at 30/07/2010 of .5538 Euros per NZD. 
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The New Zealand market is clearly closely linked to these international markets. On the 
New Zealand domestic market, there were few early trades and these were between NZ$20 per 
credit in March 2009 and NZ$21 from January 2010 until March 2010. In March 2010 the price 
began to decline until it bottomed out in May 2010 at about NZ$16. Since May 2010, prices have 
begun to climb again and in April 2011 were around NZ$22.
99
From these data, it is apparent that for the most part the EUA market, the CER market, 
and the NZU market are closely related, with the NZU price and the CER price matching one 
another particularly closely – as expected, given that CERs can be used for New Zealand 
compliance. However, in March/April 2010 the NZU price diverges from the CER price and 
decreases. This decrease was likely due to “speculation that ... attempts to delay the emitters’ 
entrance to the market has [sic] been successful”.
 These are still around NZ$2 (€1) 
less than CERs but are now considerably lower than EUAs. 
100
5.1.2.  Carbon Market Interactions 
 However, after 1 July passed and the ETS 
came into effect, the price began to recover and converge with the CER price again. As of mid-
August, the price had yet to fully recover. The current gap between the CER and NZU prices 
may be due to the NZU’s partial dependence on the domestic market (because of international 
transaction costs and because NZUs are not accepted in the EU ETS), but it is too early to be 
sure.  
New Zealand on the international market 
To date there have been few sales of carbon credits from New Zealand firms to overseas 
buyers, although significant sales have been made to the Norwegian government. However, New 
                                                 
98 European Carbon Exchange, 2010; OMFinancial, 2010 
99 OMFinancial, 2011 
100 Point Carbon, 2010b, p. 2. 27 
 
Zealand has the potential to make significant international sales. Some claim that New Zealand’s 
carbon credits have a great reputation on the international stage that gives New Zealand a 
competitive advantage in the carbon market. New Zealand’s carbon credits are transparent and 
are the product of a system with a binding national cap and a strong monitoring regime that has 
imposed a carbon price on large parts of the economy. Moreover, New Zealand is the only 
country outside Europe with a federal ETS.
101 In contrast, other countries such as those in 
Eastern Europe may be selling “hot air” credits that have questionable environmental integrity. 
Since the buyers of credits such as Norway and Denmark want to maintain a good 




Unique to New Zealand’s market are brokers’ deals that aggregate credits. Since “a 
majority of New Zealand forests are in small [forest owners’] hands”, it is difficult for many to 
sell credits since they do not have enough credits to attract buyers. Thus, some brokers in New 
Zealand are working on aggregation deals, where they put credits from many small forest owners 
into a single pool to be sold to a single buyer. The revenue from the sale is then split 
proportionally among the owners of the pooled credits. This is a relatively easy transaction for 
the brokers, and some of these transactions have already gone through successfully.
103
Usage of brokers 
 One 
caveat is that the prices that the small forest owners receive are a little bit less than they would 
prefer, but since their credits would not sell otherwise they are optimistic about the situation. 
At the moment, there are a few brokerages on the market. Only one of them (Westpac) 
is a big bank, and only one of them (OMFinancial) is a brokerage that deals in financial 
instruments other than carbon. A few carbon-only intermediaries, such as Carbon Market 
Solutions and the New Zealand Carbon Exchange, also have a strong presence on the market. 
Competition between brokerages has been relatively strong and has been gaining momentum. 
Commissions for brokers of deals with smaller foresters have been running at about 5%, while 
commissions for deals with larger foresters remain undisclosed.
104




                                                 
101 Correspondence with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 3 June 2011 
 One reason why a large number of domestic deals have been made without the 
use of an intermediary is the small size of New Zealand; it is very easy for buyers and sellers of 
102 Interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 3 August 2010 
103 Interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 3 August 2010 
104 Interview with Nick Brittain, formerly of Carbon Market Solutions, 13 August 2010 
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credits to network without the help of a broker, making these deals more common than they 
might be in a larger country.
106
The domestic carbon market 
  
Because the domestic carbon market is an embryonic market, it has been for the most 
part “limited and illiquid”
107 (although it has been improving since 1 July 2010), and brokers 
report observing a lack of supply in the market.
108
Transparency in the market is particularly lacking, given that the NZEUR does not 
publish data on the size or prices of individual transactions. However, the lack of transparency is 
a “hallmark of a new market” and transparency will likely improve over time.
 Although nearly all of the foresters who 
wanted to sell have sold, many are holding back their credits because they have rotations to be 
harvested in coming years and are worried about the liabilities that they may face. 
109 Large, high-
profile international trades such as Ernslaw One’s 500,000-credit deal with Norway have been 
instrumental in helping both foresters and banks realise the potential value in the sale of carbon 
credits.
110
Another important thing to note is that few (if any) forward contracts have been made, 
although some parties are looking to make them and may be currently negotiating for them.
  
111
Purchases at the price cap 
 
This number of forward contracts is also likely a result of the fledgling state of the market and 
the political uncertainty about the future. 
Currently, the New Zealand government will sell NZUs to firms at NZ$25. This 
effectively caps the price of an NZU at $25. One worry the forestry sector has is that emitters 
will choose to purchase their NZUs at the NZ$25 cap rather than purchasing cheaper forestry 
units.
112
                                                 
106 Interview with Peter Weir of Ernslaw One, 22 July 2010 
 A few firms have stated that they may consider purchasing at the cap, although this 
seems to be a counterintuitive decision given that units are trading materially under that. This 
may be economically irrational but is still a commonly expressed view. Stated reasons for this are 
all based on market uncertainty. A number of people do not trust the system and as a result 
choose instead to buy at the government cap, which has zero transaction costs and is seen by 
107 Interview with David Rhodes of Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
108 Interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 3 August 2010 
109 Interview with Nick Brittain, formerly of Carbon Market Solutions, 13 August 2010 
110 A handful of individuals are selling small volumes of NZUs on www.trademe.co.nz, which is a goods auctioning site that is the New Zealand 
domestic equivalent of eBay. On TradeMe, the prices of the transaction are recorded for the public to view, and the results of these transactions, 
when and if they go through, would send some price signals to the market.  Another carbon trading platform has been launched at 
www.carbonmatch.co.nz 
111 Interview with Nick Brittain, formerly of Carbon Market Solutions, 13 August 2010 
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emitters as a “risk-free investment” because they do not have to worry about what may happen 
to the value of the credits that they purchase if the system fails.
113
In addition, some firms have enough market power that they can pass the full cost of the 
cap on to their consumers. As a result, they may buy at the zero transaction costs cap and see 
little impact on their profits.
  
114
As the market develops and the uncertainty about the ETS dissipates, the number of 
people purchasing credits from the government instead of from the market (including from the 
forestry sector) should decrease significantly. 
 
5.2.  Participation 
5.2.1.  NZEUR Registration 
As of June 1 2011, there are seven participants registered with NZEUR for deforestation 
of pre-1990 forest land. 1,132 participants are registered for owning post-1989 forest land. There 
are 35 participants with “registered forestry rights”, and 11 participants are “registered lessees” 
of post-1989 forest land. Of the 1,178 participants registered for post-1989 forest, the large 
majority are individuals and privately owned companies. Seven participants are local government 
bodies (Ashburton District Council, Hawkes Bay Regional Council, Mackenzie District Council, 
Marlborough District Council/Kaikoura District Council (listed as one participant), Southland 
District Council, and Wellington City Council).
115
As of August 20 2010, there were no official reports on the percentage of potential 
participants that had entered. MAF was “swamped” with applications, to the point where they 
had had to roll over the processing of some applications past the deadline because they could not 
process them fast enough.
  
116 This occurred because many people waited to submit due to 
uncertainty in the system, and as deadlines approached they all submitted at the same time.
117
5.2.2.  Forest Ownership 
 
Thus, although there was initial hesitancy, it seems that there were many people interested in 
registering for the system.  
According to the National Exotic Forest Description (NEFD) of 2008, out of New 
Zealand’s approximately 1,761,000 hectares of plantation forest, 89% is privately owned, 4% is 
                                                 
113 This is of course only an issue if they do not surrender them immediately for compliance. Interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial, 3 
August 2010. 
114 Interview with Nick Brittain, formerly of Carbon Market Solutions, 13 August 2010 
115  New Zealand Emissions Unit Register, 2010 
116 Interview with David Rhodes of the Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
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owned by a registered public company, 2% is owned by state-owned enterprises, 2% is owned by 
central government, and 3% is owned by local government bodies.
 118
According to the Forest Owners Association, the five biggest private companies 
(Hancock Natural Resource Group, Kaingaroa Forests, Matariki Forests, Global Forest Partners 
LP, and Ernslaw One) own approximately 43% of New Zealand’s forest land. The next 10 
biggest owners of forest have approximately 15% of forest ownership. MAF owns about 3.5% 
of forest land. All others (those who own less than 10,000 hectares of forest land) comprise 
about 38% of the total forest ownership.
 Of this land, around two-
thirds is pre-1990 forest, so relatively unaffected by the ETS.
  
119
5.2.3.  Data on the Sizes and Locations of Registered Forest 
 This high concentration of forest land ownership 
could suggest that a small number of participants led to a high percentage of post-1989 forest 
land being enrolled, but post-1989 forest ownership is much more dispersed.  
This section provides an indication of the size and location of registered forests. As of 10 
August 2010, MAF had processed 384 applications, covering 110,173 hectares (out of around 
592,000 hectares) of post-1989 forest.
120
Figure 5: Post-1989 applications to the ETS by plot size 
 Thus, approximately 17.8 percent of post-1989 forest 
had been registered. Two hundred and eleven other applications had been received but not 
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these same numbers here for consistency. 
119  New Zealand Forest Owners Association and the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010, p. 9. 
120 All data in this section is provided by personal communication with MAF Sustainable Programmes, August 2010. 




1–50  59% 
51–100  13% 
101–500  22% 
501–1000  1% 
1000+  5% 31 
 
Figure 6: Approved post-1989 applications to the ETS by area and location 
 
From these figures, it is apparent that a large majority of the participants claiming credits 
were owners of small plots of forest, and a majority (61%) of the credits were for North Island 
forests. However, the applications received (including unprocessed applications) by 10 August 
2010 were relatively evenly spread over each island (51.5% South Island, 48.5% North Island).  32 
 
5.2.4.  Compliance Costs 
For the most part, compliance with the system has been relatively simple and low-cost. It 
is said that registering for the system is “very easy”,
121 that MAF provides “excellent service”,
122 
and that compliance is “dirt cheap”.
123 Transactions on the NZEUR have been described as 
“very simple ... and transparent”.
124
The compliance stage that seems to be causing the most difficulties is the mapping stage. 
In the case of mapping, the costs incurred are the time it takes to map and the $550 cost of 
submission to MAF. Additional costs may be incurred if a forester hires a consultant to do the 
mapping or if it takes MAF more than 4.25 hours to process the map (which may occur if the 
participant’s map has large numbers of errors, and which incurs an hourly fee of $130).
 However, although compliance certainly seems to be one of 
the least contentious points in the system, there are still a few minor issues to sort out that 
particularly affect smaller forest owners.  
125 
However, these costs are generally negligible in comparison with potential profits, and “giving up 
ten grand to claim ten mil” doesn’t seem to concern most of the people who are currently 
entering the system. Since most large firms have significant GIS expertise available, they are less 
likely to have problems with mapping. Difficulties in mapping generally arise with foresters who 
own small and middle-sized plots of forest land, and are for the most part caused by lack of 
experience with GIS technology.
126
In a few cases a lack of photographic evidence has caused some difficulties in 
determining the age of trees. For the most part, though, foresters have records of when their 
forests were planted. And for those who are not in possession of adequate records, it is often 
easy to tell whether the tree is post-1989 or pre-1990 simply by observing the size of the tree.
  
127
The final minor issue with compliance is that due to MAF’s rollovers of some 
applications past the deadlines (see section 5.2.1), many smaller foresters have not received their 
unit allocations in a timely manner. Once the uncertainties about the scheme have been ironed 
out, the problem of a flood of applications being presented to MAF is unlikely to recur. 
  
Despite these issues with mapping, allocation, and age determination, however, most 
foresters are able to register for the system and monitor their stocks with “minimal fuss”.
128
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Thus, the decision of whether or not to participate in the system is, for most foresters, probably 
not based on the cost of compliance with the system. 
5.3.  Behavioural Change 
5.3.1.  The Shadow of Uncertainty 
Because forestry is a long-term investment with many business decisions being made 20 
to 30 years in advance of the sale of the product, foresters must predict the future to undertake 
risk management and decision-making analysis. However, the ETS is mired in uncertainties that 
make decisions difficult for foresters. Very little carbon is sequestered in the first few years of 
growth, so the carbon prices that are critical for new planting, if timber price expectations alone 
do not justify it and hence the planting is “additional”, are more than five years ahead.  
Most of the uncertainty that those involved in the forestry ETS are facing is over the 
future of international agreements. After the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties failed to 
produce a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol, people seemed to be less hopeful that the 
2010 conference in Cancún would be fruitful. In a 2010 survey of people from 118 countries, it 
was found that only 37% of people believed that a binding successor to Kyoto would be reached 
in Cancún; this is a significant decrease from the 59% of people in their previous survey who 
believed that a successor agreement would be reached in Copenhagen.
129
A failure to produce an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol before its expiration in 2012 
poses a significant threat to the New Zealand system, as New Zealand’s rules mimic the Kyoto 
Protocol’s rules. Our market is small and built on the assumption of links to international 
markets as a way to manage variability and risk, provide liquidity and achieve more ambitious 
future mitigation targets. Our price is closely linked to the CER price. Without an international 
agreement or strong bilateral linkages with other countries with binding commitments, these 
trades will not be possible. 
 Even though significant 
progress was made on many fronts in Cancún, an extension to the Kyoto Protocol in its current 
form seems even less likely and the form of its successor is still unclear. A complete breakdown 
of cooperation is even less likely, but the exact form of future cooperation and how international 
trading will operate within that is highly uncertain.  
Even if other countries do take on mutually recognised commitments, uncertainty 
surrounds whether they will put a price on their carbon emissions.
130
                                                 
129 Point Carbon, 2010a, p. 34 
 If they choose to put a 
130 Some commentators have talked about the importance of having a carbon price implemented by New Zealand’s trading partners. For foresters 
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price on carbon by implementing an ETS and allow private sector links to other countries’ 
markets, then private companies will begin to engage in trade and the international market will 
develop much more rapidly.  
The uncertainty on the international scale directly translates into domestic uncertainty. 
Without international action, there is a higher likelihood that the New Zealand government will 
extend the transition period and the $25 cap, push back or even remove agriculture from the 
scheme, or even repeal the ETS in its entirety. Although the latter is rather unlikely given the 
costs of unravelling the scheme, many believe that the first two options are not entirely far-
fetched.
131 For example, Minister of Agriculture David Carter has stated, “There’s no point in 
disadvantaging New Zealand farmers while agricultural producers elsewhere are causing more 
emissions”.
132
A survey commissioned by MAF suggests that this uncertainty is playing a major part in 
registration for the scheme. For medium and small foresters, uncertainty is the second most cited 
reason for not joining, after lack of knowledge about it. For large foresters, all of whom know 
about its existence (85% reported that they knew “a lot” about the scheme, and 10% knew “a 
moderate amount”), uncertainty and not seeing the benefits of the scheme are the two primary 
reasons for not registering.
 If these changes are made to the scheme (especially the pushback or non-inclusion 
of agriculture), the development of the domestic market will remain slow.  
133
On the other hand, people involved in the forestry ETS see great profitability in the 
scheme if the government retains it, especially if a strong international agreement is reached and 
international carbon markets develop further. However, due to the enormous uncertainties, the 
forestry sector has not been so eager to respond to the system, especially with respect to new 
planting. 
  
5.3.2.  New Planting 
Participants can respond to the ETS in three ways: new planting, extended rotations, and 
changes in forest management. No significant changes in the latter two can be observed at least 
                                                                                                                                                        
carbon price. The entry of our trading partners (or potential competitors) is important for the issue of “leakage” which affects other sectors and 
creates political pressure against tightening of the New Zealand ETS.  
131 According to an interview with Geoff Keey of Greenpeace on 28 July 2010, complete dissolution of the ETS seems to be highly unlikely. This 
is because dissolution will involve one of two options in relation to forestry, both of which are unpalatable to the government: compensation to 
forestry owners that could involve large payouts to foresters at a time when civil services are being cut back; or ending the programme without 
compensation, which would cause large monetary losses in the forestry sector for foresters who have planted in anticipation of carbon rewards, 
creating vitriol between the government and forestry participants. It would be extremely hard to regain trust and would make it extremely costly 
to recreate a system when strong international cooperation does emerge. According to an interview with Nigel Brunel of OMFinancial on 3 
August 2010, ending the scheme before 2012 is especially unlikely because it would result in high deforestation rates and a Kyoto liability for the 
government. 
132 Hotton, 2010 
133 A C Nielsen, 2010, pp.  17–18, 25. 15 large forest owners (more than 1000 hectares) were surveyed, along with 142 medium forest owners 
(between 100 and 1000 hectares) and 176 small forest owners (less than 100 hectares). 35 
 
until the large harvests predicted in the 2020s, simply because of the current age of most New 
Zealand post-1989 forests (post-pruning/thinning and pre-harvest).
134
Figure 7: New planting in New Zealand, 1950–2010
 The only marker that can 
be adequately assessed is new planting. Below is a graph of new planting since 1920, from the 




At the moment, the amount of new planting for ETS-related carbon forests is negligible. 
The small amount of new planting that has occurred in 2008 and 2009 is “largely attributable to 
the Afforestation Grants Scheme”, not the ETS.
136 The reason for this is that since foresters see 
the uncertainty present in the system, there is great hesitancy to invest in new forest just for the 
sake of carbon credits. At the moment, most forest participants still have “a policy of growing 
for the best wood value”,
137 meaning that any new planting undertaken is done primarily because 
the participant feels that the timber will be profitable, not because of the value of the carbon 
stored within the stock. If the carbon price falls the forester will still have valuable timber, thus 
reducing their risk. This is reflected in the MAF-commissioned survey discussed in the previous 
section, which shows that only 7% of foresters considering conversion of land to forestry are 
planning that forest be used only for carbon sequestration.
138
An interesting consequence that becomes visible here is that any new planting that 
occurred during 2008/09 was almost certainly for carbon sequestration purposes only: timber 
 Further evidence that a majority of 
foresters are not planting solely for carbon purposes is that foresters are not planting on 
marginal land, but rather are still planting on the land that gives them the best timber values.  
                                                 
134 A very small number of firms may be spending less on pruning and thinning in response to the ETS, but that is a minor impact that may have 
been undertaken anyway. (Interview with Bryan Smith of Wellington City Council, 10 August 2010) 
135 New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010a 
136  New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010d 
137 Interview with Peter Weir of Ernslaw One, 22 July 2010 
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prices in these years were so low that new planting would only be profitable if foresters were 
pricing in the carbon sequestration value. 
More significant evidence that new planting as a result of the system is minimal can be 
found in the MAF-commissioned survey. In the survey, it was found that only 9% of post-1989 
forest owners are actively considering converting more land to forest, in comparison to the 44% 
who are not considering it at all.
139 None of those actively considering it are large foresters, 
mainly because large foresters have no more land to convert (60% report this).
140
Another barrier to investment in new planting is an increase in the price of land. Because 
of the added value that the potential for carbon forestry brings to land, prices of carbon-viable 
land plots have increased. However, the owners of this land have unrealistic expectations about 
the land’s value, given the current uncertainty. If there were no uncertainty, it is likely that the 
forest participants looking to plant new forest would purchase the land at the current price. 
However, they are reluctant because they are nervous that if they purchase this land and the 
system is discontinued, the value of the land will go down, causing them to experience a capital 
loss and rendering any trees that they planted for carbon on that land unprofitable.
 
141
A final issue of note is that there are currently not enough seedlings available in the 
nurseries for every forester to be able to undertake new planting, and the supply of radiata 
seedlings is not expected to be at that level for another 2–3 years.
  
142
5.3.3.  Deforestation 
 However, this does not seem 
to have any significant impact on forest participants’ current planting decisions. 
Due to the liability imposed on those who deforest, rates of deforestation should slow in 
New Zealand under the ETS. This is because some marginal land that may have been deforested 
and converted to another land use without the ETS is no longer economic to deforest once the 
price of carbon is internalised. Evidence suggests that this response is occurring as a result of the 
ETS. For example, it has been estimated that only 1800 hectares of planted production forest 
were deforested in the year to March 31 2009, compared to 15,600 hectares in the year to March 
2008. Most of this occurred before 31 December 2007.
143 Furthermore, of these 1800 hectares 
deforested in the year to March 31 2009, 1500 hectares were post-1989 forest.
144
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141 Information from this paragraph from interview with Phil Taylor of Blakely Pacific, 12 August 2010 
142 Interview with Maurice Murray of Murray’s Nurseries, 9 August 2010 
143 Manley, 2009, p. 5, estimates that deforestation in the year to 31 Dec. 2007 was 20,000. 
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Further evidence can be found in MAF’s 2009 Deforestation Survey, which measures 
forest owners’ intentions to deforest. In the survey, an ETS scenario with all forest owners 
participating would only see 3500 hectares deforested in 2009;
146 by contrast, without an ETS 
7000 hectares would be deforested in 2009.
147 Over time, the Deforestation Survey shows that 
this is expected to slow significantly; in the period from 2013 to 2020, 17,000 hectares are 
expected to be deforested with an ETS (approximately 2400 hectares per year, a decrease in 
deforestation).
148 In that same period, MAF predicts that 63,000 hectares of land will be 
deforested (approximately 9000 hectares per year, an increase in deforestation) if there is no 
ETS.
149
The rate of conversion of land from forest to dairy has also slowed since the 
introduction of the ETS.
  
150
It is also important to note that it is possible that deforestation has continued as usual; 
people may be harvesting their forests but not yet replanting (instead waiting out the allowed 
grace period for replanting) because they are waiting to see how the ETS policy will resolve itself 
after 2012. If the policy does not survive or is watered down, they may change land use. 
 It is plausible that a substantial amount of this slowing could be due 
to a lack of capital investment as a result of the recession hitting a heavily indebted sector, but 
based on the findings of the Deforestation Survey, it seems that the ETS has certainly had some 
impact. 
                                                 
145 Data collated from years 2005–2009 of the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry National Exotic Forest Description (NEFD), 
accessible online at http://www.maf.govt.nz/news-resources/publications.aspx?title=National%20Exotic%20Forest%20Description, last 
accessed 18 May 2011. 
146  Manley, 2010, p. 5. The 2010 NEFD report shows that only 1800 hectares were eventually deforested.  
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5.3.4.  General Feelings and Predictions of Future Planting Practices 
There is a wide variety of predictions about future planting in response to the forestry 
ETS, and these opinions reflect uncertainty about the future direction that the policy will take.  
In general, people involved in the forestry sector of the system seem confident that if the 
government and the international arena resolve the major policy uncertainties, there will be 
significant new planting. Despite the possibility that the strength of the ETS will be decreased as 
a result of the lack of international policy, many involved share cautious optimism about the 
future of new planting. If the system is maintained as-is and the price of carbon increases, “the 
market would go ballistic”.
151
What will happen to the New Zealand policy, however, is of great debate. There is 
general belief that the ETS is here to stay; even without a new global agreement, New Zealand 
will likely keep the system, possibly even joining in to a regional scheme that maintains the ETS 
incentives.
  
152 Some believe that without a commitment by the USA, Australia, Japan, and New 
Zealand’s other trading partners, however, the form that the ETS will take may be even more 
watered down than its current form. According to these individuals, if there is not a “comparable 
effort from the rest of the world”, then the entrance of agriculture into the scheme may be 
pushed back or not included at all.
 153 If agriculture does enter the New Zealand scheme, 
agricultural profits will decrease with a related decrease in the price of marginal land. As a result, 
more land will be converted from agriculture and into forestry. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
government will extend other transitional measures such as the NZ$25 price cap if New 
Zealand’s trading partners do not put a price on carbon by 2012.
154
International and subsequent domestic uncertainty does not seem to be resolving itself 
quickly, which suggests that new planting will not occur quickly. Over the course of the first 
commitment period and in the short run thereafter, many do not expect new planting to occur at 
all. Even if the uncertainty is resolved before the 2012 end of the Kyoto Protocol, the New 
Zealand forest industry will need to undergo a “mindset change” before any substantial new 
planting is undertaken.
 Some believe that if these 
things occur, the price of carbon will be kept low, along with domestic demand for forestry 
credits.  
155
                                                 
151 Interview with Bryan Smith of Wellington City Council, 10 August 2010 
 Many people, especially those who are farmers but who are considering 
placing forests on their marginal land, will have to learn how to manage their forests and weigh 
152 Interview with Alex Thompson of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 5 August 2010 
153 Interview with David Rhodes of the Forest Owners Association, 21 July 2010 
154 Interview with Peter Hardstaff of the World Wildlife Fund, 27 July 2010 
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their land-use options. Nurseries will have to produce a new stock, which will also take time. 
Thus, New Zealand’s uptake of new planting are predicted to be slow initially, even if the 
uncertainty is resolved, but once people and markets adjust to the system there will be much 
more new planting. 
In summary, people involved with the forestry side of the system seem to be relatively 
confident that if current carbon prices are sustained and policy becomes stable, New Zealand 
will see new planting, resulting in “fewer cows and more trees”.
156
5.4.  Steps for Future Improvement 
 If international and domestic 
policies also impose a cost on agricultural production, forestry will become even more attractive.  
5.4.1.  Force Majeure 
One provision that is particularly important to forest owners is the inclusion of a force 
majeure clause. Under the current system, if a fire, windstorm, or other natural disaster outside 
of the participant’s control fells the forest species, the participant is immediately fully liable for 
the emitted carbon. This is especially a problem for owners of small, concentrated forest plots 
who may have their entire forest holding uprooted by such a disaster. Insurance is available for 
carbon in such forests, but at least until recently was very costly.
157 Therefore, without force 
majeure provisions, the ETS initially “present[ed] far too much risk for some would-be 
investors”.
158
5.4.2.  The Instant Oxidisation Rule 
  
The Kyoto rules currently run under the assumption that when forest land is harvested, 
all of the carbon in the harvested wood is instantly released back into the atmosphere and all 
carbon on deforested land is released. However, this is far from the truth. Much of the carbon 
remains sequestered in wood products or in woody litter on the land for years after the harvest 
of the forest. If New Zealand can change its own rules or successfully change the international 
rules, then forest participants may face a lower liability at harvest. One caveat is that there will be 
increased costs of monitoring and measuring the stock of carbon in harvested wood products. 
However, these costs may not be as high as the potential gains from moving away from the 
instant oxidisation assumption. 
In addition, current Kyoto rules make a landowner who deforests pre-1990 land liable 
for the carbon stock in the forest at the time of deforestation. This is a much larger amount than 
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the average carbon stored in a forest that would have been managed as a rotation forest. Setting 
this rule more efficiently would reduce the need for compensation for pre-1990 forests and 
might lead to a little more deforestation on land with valuable alternative uses. 
5.4.3.  Offset Planting 
Another change that the forestry sector would like to see in the New Zealand ETS is a 
system of offset planting. This is where a forester can essentially relocate pre-1990 forest from 
one place to another without facing a liability (since currently a pre-1990 participant can cut 
down and replant in the same spot without penalty, but if the participant deforests and relocates 
the forest, they will face the pre-1990 liability and then be essentially starting a post-1989 forest). 
The forestry sector feels that “since the atmosphere sees no difference” this type of relocation 
should be allowed, provided it is the same species, accumulates the same amount of carbon and 
at minimum has no adverse impact on biodiversity.
159
Currently, offset planting is not allowed in the New Zealand ETS because it is not 
allowed in the Kyoto rules. In Kyoto this is useful because it protects against the removal of 
forests that have specific benefits in their current location (e.g. the Amazon rainforest). 
However, in New Zealand’s case, this rule has restrictive economic and environmental impacts 
that reduce efficiency.
 This would have a similar effect to 
reducing the liability on deforestation. A forester could pay that lower liability, plant a new forest 
and claim the credits on that area. The value of the new carbon would almost offset the liability 
loss.  
160
5.4.4.  “Averaging” 
 New Zealand is lobbying on the international level to allow for offset 
planting for certain cases like New Zealand.  
Another suggestion that has been brought up by people involved in the forestry sector is 
a provision for “averaging”, where foresters have the option of selling credits only up to a long-
term average of their stock but equally face no penalties at harvest as long as they replant.
161 This 
would be done to prevent forest owners from overselling their carbon credits. This mechanism is 
sought in particular by farm foresters, and the New Zealand Forest Owners Association suggests 
it as an option.
162 This could be implemented by government or through a sophisticated private 
actor.
163
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Foresters with larger holdings would not want this to be compulsory because they are 
already able to do this on their own; they do not need a government regulation that forces them 
to stop selling their credits at a certain point when they are easily able to calculate this risk and 
make decisions on how much to buy or sell themselves. It is seen as a “mother knows best” 
policy that has potential to “cut [foresters] off at the pass” by limiting the potential profits they 
may make through sales of credits.
164
5.4.5.  Biodiversity Protection 
  
Protecting biodiversity is another aspect of the forestry Emissions Trading Scheme that 
needs to be improved. Two parts of the current forestry ETS law can be seen as harmful to 
biodiversity. First, pre-1990 indigenous forest species are not included in the ETS. Although it is 
true that the Forests Act 1949 protects relatively mature forests from clearance by timber 
companies, they may still be vulnerable to clearing for agricultural purposes. The protection of 
indigenous forests is devolved to Regional Councils under the Resource Management Act; some 
may struggle to effectively protect all indigenous forest. In some cases, pre-1990 indigenous 
forests could be endangered by the ETS.  
Second, biodiversity is threatened when fast-growing plantation forest is planted in areas 
where it may out-compete indigenous species when, for example, wilding pines spread onto 
neighbouring land. This is mainly a problem with small plantation foresters, since most of the 
large plantation forest companies signed the New Zealand Forest Accord, which is meant to 
protect indigenous forests from such results.
165
MAF’s look-up tables – which define the rate at which different sorts of forests earn 
carbon credits – initially allocated indigenous forest anywhere in New Zealand with three NZUs 
per hectare per year. The indigenous species mānuka and kānuka have been estimated to stock 
an average of 7.0–9.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per hectare per year over the first 40 
years of a forest’s life.
 Potential biodiversity is also threatened where 
land is reverting to native forest but has not yet reached a level of maturity that allows it to be 
protected by the Forest Accord. Without the ETS, this land (and other land still in low 
productivity pasture) may have become native forest because timber returns alone are too low. 
With the added incentives from the ETS it might be cleared and converted to exotic forest.  
166
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 Thus, MAF’s original look up tables did not fully internalise the benefit 
of sequestration to owners of these indigenous species.  This provided too little incentive to 
165 Interview with Geoff Keey of Greenpeace, 28 July 2010 
166 Trotter et al., 2005. According to Trotter et al., mānuka/kānuka forest sequesters carbon at a rate of 1.9–2.5 tonnes per hectare per year, which 
is equivalent to 7.0–9.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per hectare per year. 42 
 
allow reversion of land to indigenous forest.  However, MAF updated their look up tables in 
October of 2010, and now a hectare of indigenous forest earns 305.1 NZUs over the first 40 
years of its life (an average of 7.6 NZUs per hectare per year). For many indigenous forests, this 
is probably overly generous. However, this adjustment to the look up tables should help protect 
biodiversity in New Zealand. 
Another way that biodiversity can be protected and collateral damage to the environment 
mitigated is through further restriction of wilding pines. Currently, post-1989 wilding pines may 
secure credits for carbon sequestration and incur a liability if they are cut down on land that has 
entered the ETS. Although the tree-weed exemption is present (see section 3.2.3), it only solves 
the problem of the liability; it does not resolve the perverse incentive to encourage growth of 
wilding pines for the sake of gaining carbon credits.
167
5.4.6.  Number of Free Allowances Granted to Emitters 
 This may be controlled under the 
Resource Management Act but where it is not, wilding pines may be present in greater 
abundance than they should be and may cause significant damage to indigenous species and 
ecosystems. 
Another issue that some commentators believe needs to be amended in order to solidify 
the domestic market and keep New Zealand at a Kyoto surplus is the number of free allowances 
granted to emitters. Currently, eligible emitters receive free allowances on an intensity basis (i.e. 
per unit of output) dependent on the degree of perceived trade exposure beginning from a 
prescribed allocative baseline. This rate is reduced at 1.3% per year. Moreover, in the first 
commitment period emitters have a two-for-one deal where they need to surrender only one 
NZU for every two tonnes of carbon equivalent that they emit, and the price of an NZU is 
capped at NZ$25 (so effectively, emitters are paying a maximum of NZ$12.50 per tonne). These 
measures reduce domestic demand for forestry units.  
5.4.7.  The Need for Complementary Policies 
The ETS provides a strong framework for New Zealand’s climate change policy, but like 
many complex policies it will need other complementary policies surrounding it in order for 
incentives to mitigate climate change to be realised to their full potential. With respect to the 
forestry sector, complementary policies that stimulate new planting or forestry demand may have 
significant effects on New Zealand carbon sequestration and are therefore imperative to consider 
when thinking about ways to decrease New Zealand’s carbon footprint.  
                                                 
167 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2009b, pp. 5–6 43 
 
New Zealand currently has three policies in place that partly complement the ETS but 
are largely substitutes: the Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative, the Afforestation Grants Scheme, 
and the East Coast Forestry Project. Three other policies have been suggested as potential 
complements to the ETS. The first and arguably most important complementary policy to 
consider implementing is a program to educate forest owners and potential farm foresters on the 
workings of the ETS and the potential profit opportunities from earning carbon credits. At the 
moment, there is a large amount of confusion and misinformation regarding the ETS, and this 
makes behavioural change very difficult. A survey of potential post-1989 participants showed 
that out of the 98% of foresters who are aware of the scheme, only 47% claimed to know “a lot” 
(14 percent) or “a moderate amount” (33%) about the ETS.
168 A significant portion of potential 
new planters have not acted simply for a perceived lack of knowledge about the scheme. 
Furthermore, the same survey found that increased perceived knowledge about the system is 
directly correlated with positive perceptions about it; 50% of people who knew a lot about the 
system felt positively towards it, whereas only 5% who had “heard of it but know hardly 
anything or nothing about it” felt positively towards the system.
169
Wider education about the value of the policy and the importance of certainty would also 
lead to pressure on government to firm up current policies, with positive impacts on future new 
planting. 
 This shows that increasing 
education about the scheme may improve people’s perceptions of the scheme and could induce 
participation. Among others, the Canterbury School of Forestry has offered popular workshops 
to disseminate this knowledge. 
Another suggestion is to create incentives to use wood where possible in infrastructure, 
rather than carbon-intensive steel or concrete.
170
                                                 
168 A C Nielsen, 2010, pp. 16–17. This figure includes all forest owners surveyed, large and small. Large forestry owners were likely to have better 
knowledge. 
 This may have the double benefit of increasing 
demand for timber and therefore increasing new planting (if increased domestic demand does 
not simply displace existing log exports) and decreasing domestic demand for carbon-intensive 
products. As long as steel and concrete production are partly protected within the ETS, because 
they are “trade exposed”, the climate externalities from them are not fully internalised and this 
could be a useful policy. Because New Zealand exports so much of its forest products, however, 
domestic timber demand may not have strong price impacts. Nevertheless, development of 
timber-based construction technologies and dissemination of information about their potential 
value could lead to greater international demand for timber in the longer term. 
169A C Nielsen, 2010, p. 22 
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In addition, if current research is successful in reducing the cost of converting wood 
products into biodiesel, then this has the potential to further lower New Zealand’s carbon 
footprint and to create additional demand for new planting. A recent study coordinated by New 
Zealand’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment suggests that wood-based biodiesel 
equal to approximately 10% of New Zealand’s 2008 diesel consumption could be produced 
cheaply at about NZ$1.85 per litre.
171
6. Conclusions 
 Others (e.g. Hall and Jack, 2009) suggest that the cost of 
this biodiesel may be much higher. Because the ETS covers transport fuels, no additional 
incentive-based policy would be required to encourage efficient levels of biofuel supply.  
Currently it seems that the forestry component of the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme is slowly gaining steam. Deforestation activity has noticeably decreased and owners of 
post-1989 forest land have begun to register for the scheme. Compliance costs have proven to 
be relatively low, and although the market is still fledgling, opaque, and illiquid, it is becoming 
gradually less so. NZU prices are roughly linking to international prices for Clean Development 
Mechanism and European units in ways that makes sense.  
However, in order to achieve the large scale of new planting that modelling suggests 
would be efficient, there are still significant obstacles to overcome. The most important of these 
is uncertainty. Because of the significant uncertainties surrounding the future of international and 
domestic ETS policy, potential forest planters are hesitant to make large, long-term investments 
into carbon forestry, and so few have begun to plant new forest. On a positive note, there is 
reason to be optimistic that if this uncertainty is resolved, carbon sequestration could make a 
significant contribution to New Zealand’s climate mitigation effort and provide a useful model 
for other countries’ efforts. 
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8.  Appendix: Other Important Forestry ETS Rules 
The information in this appendix is sourced from New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry and New Zealand Inland Revenue Department
  ETS guides.
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8.1.  How Does the New Zealand ETS Define a Forest? 
  
According to the MAF Guide, which is a summary of the Climate Change Response Act, 
a forest is defined as an area of land of at least 1 hectare that contains forest species that have a 
crown cover of more than 30 percent on each hectare and an average crown cover width of at 
least 30 metres. A forest species is defined as “trees capable of reaching five metres in height at 
maturity in the place they are growing”, excluding tree species that produce fruit and nuts. Fruit 
and nut trees are excluded because they do not contain much carbon and it would be more 
costly to define the removal of these trees as deforestation. 
If an area of forest temporarily does not meet the crown-cover or height standards due 
to harvesting or due to natural occurrences (e.g. wind-blown trees), but is likely to in the future, 
the land is still considered forested land. 
8.2.  How Does the New Zealand ETS Define Deforestation? 
According to the MAF Guide, deforestation is defined as “forest clearing followed by a 
change to another land use”, such as agriculture.  
8.3.  How is Compliance Monitored and What are the Penalties for Non-
Compliance within the System?  
8.3.1.  Monitoring 
MAF will monitor the system by “reviewing registration applications and emissions 
returns to ensure they comply with the legislation” and by performing “spot checks and detailed 
site audits”.
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If a participant is found to be non-compliant with the ETS, they may face civil and/or 
criminal penalties depending on the offence. As a side note, in the case of non-compliance of a 
body corporate, the government may pierce the corporate veil and find directors and other 
managers subject to penalty as well. 
 Participants must by law also keep 20 years’ worth of records on “transactions, 
measurements, calculations, and other relevant information”, which may be audited at any time 
by MAF.  
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8.3.2.  Civil Penalties for Non-Compliance 
If an individual has not submitted an emissions return on time, has submitted an 
inaccurate return, or has failed to submit a return, the individual will have to pay a fine of NZ$30 
for each NZU that they have not reported. This penalty was chosen because it is more expensive 
than the current market price of an NZU. The NZU has a maximum price of NZ$25 (which the 
government will guarantee by selling units to firms at NZ$25) until the end of the first 
commitment period in 2012 in order to reduce price uncertainty and allow for a smooth 
transition of participants into the system. This penalty may be reduced or dismissed at the 
discretion of MAF, in order to prevent participants who have made genuine mistakes or who 
have unique and legitimate personal circumstances from suffering harsh penalties. 
If a participant knowingly fails to comply with obligations or provides false information, 
they may be liable to surrender double the units that they owe as well as pay NZ$30 per unit. 
In all cases, interest will accrue on all unpaid penalties until they are paid in full and the 
necessary units have been surrendered. 
8.3.3.  Criminal Penalties for Non-Compliance 
If a participant fails to collect information, submit an emissions return, or notify MAF 
that they are an obligatory participant, there is a graduated series of fines that increase with each 
offence (NZ$8000 first, NZ$16000 second, NZ$24000 for each subsequent offence). 
If a participant fails to appear before the chief executive of MAF or an enforcement 
officer when required, without a “reasonable excuse”, the participant must pay a fine of 
NZ$12000, or NZ$24000 if they are a body corporate. 
If a participant knowingly provides false information or wilfully attempts to obstruct 
officers, the participant must pay a fine of NZ$25000, or NZ$50000 if they are a body corporate. 
If a participant knowingly evades the ETS with intent to “deceive and obtain material 
benefit or avoid material detriment”, the participant will pay a fine of NZ$50000 and/or receive 
up to five years’ imprisonment. 
8.3.4.  Withdrawal from the ETS and Transfer of Forest Land 
A post-1989 participant who wishes to withdraw all or some of their forest from the 
system may do so at any time. However, the participant must immediately notify MAF. Then, 
within 20 days of their withdrawal, the participant must submit one final emissions return and 55 
 
“surrender...any outstanding balance of units on the land”. Thus, it is not possible for a 
participant to avoid liabilities by withdrawal from the system. 
Similar rules apply for the transfer of forest land from one party to another, whether the 
land is post-1989 or pre-1990. When forest land is transferred, the transferor and transferee must 
notify the MAF, and the transferor must file one final emissions return to correct for any 
outstanding liabilities. 
8.4.  The Forestry ETS and Taxes 
8.4.1.  Income Tax Rules for Pre-1990 Forest 
Emission unit transactions for pre-1990 forest are treated for tax purposes as being on 
the capital account, so “no income tax liabilities arise from, and no income tax deductions are 
created by, these transactions”. In other words, pre-1990 participants will not be involved with 
any tax activity as a result of their allocation, purchase, surrender, or sale of NZUs. However, 
because this only applies to “transactions in emissions units which are related to pre-1990 
forestry land”, a pre-1990 participant will have to pay income taxes on NZUs if they purchase 
NZUs and then later resell them, as these units were not involved with the pre-1990 land itself. 
The only other exception to this rule is for certain businesses such as “property 
developers and land traders”, as these businesses hold the NZUs on revenue account. As a 
result, their tax rules will be similar to those that apply to post-1989 forest land. 
8.4.2.  Income Tax Rules for Post-1989 Forest 
For post-1989 forest, emission unit transactions are treated as being in the revenue 
account. Although there are still no tax deductions or liabilities upon the allocation or surrender 
of government-allocated NZUs, the sale and purchase of NZUs are subject to the income tax 
laws. 
NZUs sold on the market will incur tax liabilities. If NZUs are purchased on the market, 
deductions are available only if the purchased units are considered “replacement units”, meaning 
that they are replacing units that have already been sold (for example, if one participant sells 10 
NZUs and then purchases 20, they can get immediate tax deductions on the first 10 units since 
these are replacing the ones that have already been sold). A deduction is only available on the 
additional units purchased at the time that the additional units are surrendered. 56 
 
8.4.3.  Goods and Services Tax Rules for Both Post-1989 and Pre-1990 Forest 
In the case of both post-1989 forest and pre-1990 forest, the Goods and Services tax on 
allocation, surrender, purchase (either by a business from government, another business, or from 
overseas), and sales (either by a business to another business or overseas) of NZUs is zero-rated. 
This means that there is a GST on the NZUs “for the purposes of measuring taxable supplies 
made by businesses”, but the rate is 0 percent and therefore there is no actual GST paid on the 
NZUs.  Recent Motu Working Papers 
All papers in the Motu Working Paper Series are available on our website www.motu.org.nz, or by contacting us on 
info@motu.org.nz or +64 4 939 4250.  
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